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Central Bank Independence, financial instability and politics:  
new evidence for OECD and non-OECD countries 
 





This paper analyses the determinants of a new index of central bank independence, recently provided by Dincer 
and Eichengreen (2014), using a large database of economic, political and institutional variables. Our sample 
includes data for 31 OECD and 49 non-OECD economies and covers the period 1998-2010. To this aim, we 
implement factorial and regression analysis to synthesize information and overcome limitations such as omitted 
variables, multicollinearity and overfitting. The results confirm the role of the IMF loans program to guide all the 
economies in their choice of more independent central banks. Financial instability, recession and low inflation 
work in the opposite direction with governments relying extensively on central bank money to finance public 
expenditure and central banks’ political and operational autonomy is inevitably undermined. Finally, only for 
non-OECD economies, the degree of central bank independence responds to various measures of strength of 
political institutions and party political instability.  
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1. Introduction  
Research on political macroeconomics during the last 20 years focused on factors affecting monetary policy and its 
performances. Several studies have examined the cause of monetary instability pointing out the key role of the 
Central Bank Independence (henceforth CBI) to account for differences in inflation rates among countries. It is 
widely documented, that a higher degree of CBI is associated with a lower inflation rate and that society reduces 
opposition to inflation and public pressure for an independent central bank (Cukierman, 2008, 2013; Alesina and 
Stella, 2010 for a review). The balance between flexibility and credibility in monetary policymaking determines 
the equilibrium degree of CBI in a country. At the same time, the trade-off between costs and benefits in delegating 
the power to manage paper money may depend on many aspects of the economy and on its institutional framework 
(Alesina and Grilli, 1995). The recognition of this fact has encouraged the study of the determinants that influence 
the CBI among the variety of economic, social and institutional variables that cause changes in the degree of 
commitment of the monetary policy. A partial list includes Farvaque (2002), Polillo and Guillén (2005), D'Amato 
et al. (2009), Pistoresi et al. (2011), Spyromitros and Tuysuz (2012), and Dincer and Eichengreen (2014). 
Nowadays the “inflation problem” is that inflation is too low, not too high. Differently from the past, where the 
main goal of the central banks was to maintain an acceptable level of inflation, financial stability is now the new 
objective both in terms of macro-prudential supervision and to the traditional pursuit of macroeconomic stability. 
Following the main financial crisis since 1998, e.g. South Korea in 1998, Turkey in 2001, the Dot-come bubble 
1999-2000 and in particular the Great financial crisis in 2007-2008, many central banks turned to forward 
guidance and/or a variety of unconventional monetary policies, such as lending to banks (and sometimes even to 
nonbanks) in huge volume, and large-scale asset purchases (“quantitative easing”) that is they use their balance 
sheets to affect market conditions (see De Haan and Eijffinger, 2017). Some of these behaviours, in particular 
those associated with the expanded fiscal role of central banks, can be also associated with the weaknesses of 
political institutions. According to Buiter (2016), “the combination of these central bank dysfunctionalities with 
the rising tide of populist, anti-elite, anti-technocratic and anti-expert sentiment in the US and the EU is likely to 
result in an early and significant reduction in the degree of operational independence of North Atlantic central 
banks, even where such independence makes sense - in the design and conduct of monetary policy, narrowly 
defined”.  
In this economic and political climate, some important questions arise: has the CBI decreased since the main 
financial crisis since? Has the role of economic and political determinants of CBI changed? Are there differences 
among OECD and non-OECD economies with respect to these topics? The goal of this paper is to investigate these 
issues. In particular, this paper analyses the determinants of a new CBI index recently provided by Dincer and 
Eichengreen (2014), from a large set of economic, political and institutional variables. Our sample regards 31 
OECD and 49 non-OECD economies and covers the sample period 1998-2010.  
To this aim, we employ factor analysis as an appropriate statistical technique to deal with large amounts of data, 
as it retains a high power of data reduction and facilitate the design of aggregated variables. Moreover, it is 
possible to analyse the interrelations among a large list of indicators in order to understand their underlying 
structure, making it possible to reduce information into a small number of aggregated variables. Since factors 
can be saved and used in further analysis, this technique reduces the chance of double-counting highly similar 
attributes (multicollinearity) as well as possible biases from having redundant exogenous variables in regression 
(overfitting). In fact, we are then able to evaluate the relative importance of each aggregate variable (factor) on 
CBI in a linear regression framework. In other words, we can select determinants of CBI given a large amount of 
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information coming from the initial database and, at the same time, avoid collinearity issues since correlated 
variables are already grouped in the factor analysis step. 
Our results show no evidence of CBI decreasing after the Great financial crisis, but identify new relevant 
determinants with respect to the previous literature. In particular, we confirm a key role of the IMF loans 
program as an international constraint, which seems to guide all the economies in their choice toward 
independent central banks. Financial instability, recession and low inflation work in the opposite direction with 
governments relying extensively on central bank money to finance public expenditure. In this context, central 
banks’ political and operational autonomy is inevitably undermined for the fulfillment of their policy objective of 
preserving price stability. Finally, the degree of CBI in non-OECD economies responds to various measures of 
strength of political institutions: the less is the strength of political institution, the higher is the incentive to 
delegate to an independent central bank, except for corruption. In fact, greater the level of corruption, higher is 
the incentive to delegate to an independent central bank. Non-OECD countries with more party political 
instability due to heterogeneous political contexts have a higher incentive to delegate to a more independent 
central bank. The delegation to an independent central bank is a way to facilitate the cohesistence of actors with 
heterogeneous preferences within the executive, i.e. coalition or minority goverment, in particular when 
information asymmetries are presents, for example, between coalition goverment parties and the executive. 
Moreover, multiparty goverment are heavily dependent on the use of fiscal policy, and this increases the 
incentive to delegate in the hands of an independent institution (non-targetable) the monetary policy or 
unpopular policies maximising the probability to be re-elected. 
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe in detail the considered dataset. Section 3 presents 
the employed methodology and empirical results. Finally, Section 4 concludes. 
 
 
2. Data  
We examine the determinants of CBI using a new index recently provided by Dincer and Eichengreen (2014), 
(denoted by the authors as CBIW). It is based on the index of legal independence by Cukierman et al. (1992) 
(called in short CWN index), but for the period 1998-2010. The CWN index is based on measures such as the 
independence of the governor of the central bank, its independence in policy formulation, its objective or 
mandate, and the limits on its lendings to the public sector. On top of that, the CBIW is augmented by adding 
other aspects of the CBI (“de-facto” criteria) emphasized by the subsequent literature: limits on the 
reappointment of the governor, measures of provisions affecting (re)appointment of board members similar to 
those affecting the governor, restrictions on government representation on the board, and intervention of the 
government in exchange rate policy formulation.   
Figure 1 shows an overall positive trend in the index CBIW (indicating greater independence) for both OECD 
and non-OECD countries over the entire period. The growth from 1998 to 2010 for the OECD group was 9.47%, 
and for non-OECD group 9.73%. For OECDs, the first increase regards years between 2000 and 2003, when the 
average rate rose from 0.59 to 0.63. In these years some countries, like Iceland, Norway, Turkey and Estonia, 
registered reform processes inducing a higher level of CBI with respect to the average. After the 2007-2008 
financial crisis, the index CBIW started a new growth for these advanced economies, while remain relatively 
stable for the other countries. For non-OECDs, the line shows a jump in the years 2003-2005, when the average 
CBIW increased from 0.45 to 0.47. The countries that have seen biggest jumps are Venezuela, Iraq, Lithuania 
and Macedonia. The graph suggests that countries with lower level of development and democracy are investing 
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in reform processes, probably due to international pressure (e.g. from IMF) to ensure financial and price stability. 
In conclusion, there is no evidence that the CBIW index has decreased not even after the Great financial crisis. 
















Figure 1. Plot of the values of CBIW index (from Dincer and Eichengreen, 2014) for OECD (dashed line) and 
non-OECD (solid line) countries during the period 1998-2010. 
 
The 47 variables used to investigate the determinants of CBI have been selected in line with recent literature on 
this topic (for a survey, see Fernández-Albertos, 2015). In particular, we consider the economic and political 
variables also used by Dincer and Eichengreen (2014) with some additional variables suggested by D'Amato et 
al. (2009). Moreover, we refer to the institutional variables used by Farvaque (2002), and Pistoresi et al. (2011). 
Our final sample includes data for 31 OECD and 49 non-OECD economies (see Note 1 for a detailed list of 
countries) and covers the years from 1998 to 2010.   
 
The economic variables are the following: Inflation (measured by CPI index), RealGDP (GDP at constant prices), 
RealGDPpc (RealGDP per capita), Liquidity (M3 to GDP), Openness (import to GDP), IMFlending (as a ratio of 
GDP), CorrelationCycle (correlation between the country GDP growth and world GDP growth, i.e. the 
worldwide common component in the business cycle), Deficit (as a ratio of GDP), and Expenditure (government 
final expenditure to GDP). Those economic determinants are taken from IMF, World Bank and FED databases 
and are averaged over the considered period.  
The political variables are taken from different sources. In particular, Stability (presence/absence of terrorism or 
political violence), Rule of Law (the confidence of the agents in societies rules, e.g. the quality of contracts 
enforcement and defense of property rights), GovEffectiveness (quality of public services, effectiveness of 
policies, credibility of government effort in the actuation of such policies), Accountability (perception of citizens 
to participate to the selection of their government members, freedom of speech and presence of free media), 
RegulatoryQ (ability of government to make laws and regulations to promote the development of the private 
sector), and Corruption (corruption of public institutions, magnitude of corrupting acts and the presence of 
“elite” and private interests at the head of state government) are taken from WGI database. Legal origin (civil or 
common-law system) and Transparency are obtained from Dincer and Eichengreen (2014). Finally, Democracy 
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(the possibility to express different preferences on different political alternatives, the existence of constraints on 
the exercise of power by the executive, the guarantee of political and civil liberties) is taken from Polity IV 
database. Also these variables are averaged over the selected years.  
The institutional variables are found in the DPI database of the World Bank, originally published by Beck et al. 
(2001). The database is divided into five groups of variables taken at the year 2010, which are the following: 1) 
Chief Executive variables, which are relevant to characterize the executive power: system (if presidential, 
assembly elected or parliamentary), yrsoffc (number of years in office), finittrm (presence of finite term in offce), 
yrcurnt (years left in current term), military (if the chief executive is a military officer), allhouse (control of all 
the houses by executive party); 2) Party variables in the legislature, which are relevant to the parties that make 
up the legislative power: numgov and numvote (number of seats and vote share of the government parties, 
respectively), totalseats (total seats of the parliament in the legislature), gov1seat and gov2seat (number of seats 
of the first and second government parties, respectively), numopp and oppvote (number of seats and vote share 
of the opposition parties, respectively), opp1seat, opp2seat and opp3seat (number of seats of the first, second and 
third opposition parties, respectively), legelec and exelec (presence of legislative or executive elections); 3) 
Electoral rules: liec and eiec (indeces of legislative and executive competitiveness), mdmh (mean district 
magnitude), plurality and pr (plurality or proportional representation), housesys (in mixed electoral systems, 
which governs the majority or all the House seats); 4) Stability and checks and balance, which relates to the 
stability of the political system: tenlong and tenshort (longest and shortest tenure of a veto players), tensys 
(duration  of democratic or autocratic system), checks (number of veto players); 5) Federalism, which relates to 
the state form: state (if local governments are elected). Finally, note that all the cited databases in this Section 
and their sources are detailed in Note 2.  
 
3. Results 
The resulting dataset has been analysed using well-known statistical tools such as factor analysis and linear 
parametric modelling. Firstly, factors are identified and variables grouped to specify a particular aspect of the 
initial dataset. Secondly, we evaluate the relative importance of each factor as determinants of CBI index. 
 
3.1 Factor Analysis 
The factors are identified following the recommended guidelines of Hair et al. (1995) and their number is 
selected in accordance to the Kaiser criterion of corresponding eigenvalues greater than one in modulus. 
Moreover, the cumulative explained variance of each selected factor is also reported and it is satisfactory. 
The analysis of the component matrices in Tables 1 and 2 indicates the type of dimension captured. Table 1 
considers factors extracted from the economic and political groups. The first factor, named “political factor”, 
mainly captures different measures of strength of political institutions, since it is highly positively correlated to 
the group of political variables (with correlation higher than 0.9): Rule of Law, GovEffectivness, Accountability, 
RegulatoryQ and Corruption. The second factor is only directly related to the degree of openness of the economy 
(with correlation higher than 0.7) and for this reason we label it as “openness factor”. Finally, the third factor is 
directly related to the national deficit to GDP and indirectly related to the IMF lending to GDP, so we name it 
“financial factor” (with major correlation over 0.57).  
Table 2 shows correlations between the institutional variables and the extracted factors. Particularly, the first and 
6 
 
the second factors are positively related to characteristics of the parties that make up the legislative power. The 
“opposition factor” is directly related to the number of seats of the first-largest, second-largest and third-largest 
opposition parties (with correlation greater than 0.75). Moreover, it relates to the total number of seats of the 
opposition coalition and to the total seats of the parliament in the legislature. The “goverment factor” is directly 
related to the number of seats of the first-largest government party and to the total number of seats of the 
goverment (correlations are higher than 0.75). The third factor, named “electoral rules”, concerns variables that 
are relevant for the electoral system: if countries have uninominal majority system or proportional representation 
and in mixed electoral systems (correlations over 0.66).  The residual factor, named “chief executive factor”, 
contains variables which are relevant to characterize the tenure and turnover of the executive power: how many 













Trasparency .789 -.211 -.187 
Inflation -.510 .069 .153 
Openness -.012 .716 -.188 
Liquidity .650 -.016 .024 
Deficit -.053 .578 .586 
Expenditure .548 .079 -.250 
RealGDPpc .855 .107 .234 
RealGDP .358 -.495 .397 
CorrelationCycle -.017 -.171 .502 
IMFlending -.272 -.140 -.573 
Stability .745 .397 -.054 
Democracy .708 -.318 -.294 
Rule of Law .968 .105 .051 
GovEffectivness .970 .129 .063 
Accountability .914 -.125 -.154 
RegulatoryQ .947 .066 -.048 
LegalOriginUK .270 -.530 .336 
Corruption .951 .159 .125 
Eigenvalue 8.185 1.820 1.543 
Explained Variance 
45.474 10.113 8.574 
Cumulative 
Explained Variance 
45.474 55.587 64.610 
Note. The table reports correlations between factors and variables. Bold face enlights the highest correlations. 
Factors are extracted following Kaiser criterion (eigenvalues greater than one in modulus) and satisfactory 














system 0.268 -0.331 0.142 -0.230 
yrsoffc -0.377 0.210 0.471 0.588 
finittrm 0.291 -0.241 -0.521 -0.305 
yrcurnt -0.047 0.154 -0.093 -0.650 
military -0.075 0.551 0.179 -0.189 
allhouse -0.256 0.489 0.045 -0.184 
numgov 0.523 0.758 0.191 -0.103 
numvote -0.146 -0.213 0.646 -0.400 
numopp 0.884 0.239 -0.022 0.117 
oppvote 0.203 -0.566 0.294 -0.214 
totalseats 0.749 0.633 0.093 0.029 
gov1seat 0.415 0.808 0.125 -0.111 
gov2seat 0.432 0.011 0.238 0.022 
opp1seat 0.772 0.304 -0.104 0.122 
opp2seat 0.787 0.108 0.138 0.032 
opp3seat 0.618 -0.035 0.182 0.034 
legelec 0.146 -0.060 -0.086 0.548 
exelec -0.015 -0.015 -0.071 0.367 
liec 0.429 -0.563 -0.237 0.244 
eiec 0.512 -0.631 -0.350 -0.088 
mdmh -0.054 -0.107 0.442 0.021 
plurality 0.011 0.429 -0.676 0.121 
pr 0.330 -0.256 0.659 -0.125 
housesys 0.165 -0.276 0.773 -0.180 
tenlong -0.439 0.262 0.323 0.281 
tenshort -0.328 0.082 0.331 0.541 
tensys 0.409 -0.412 0.275 0.198 
checks 0.376 -0.503 -0.227 0.263 
state 0.504 -0.062 0.205 0.292 
Eigenvalue 5.476 4.492 3.501 2.374 
Explained 
Variance 




18.884 34.375 46.449 54.636 
Note. The table reports correlations between factors and variables. Bold face enlights the highest correlations. 
Factors are extracted following Kaiser criterion (eigenvalues greater than one in modulus) and satisfactory 





3.2 Regression Analysis 
After having identified the relevant group of variables in factors, we aim at evaluating the relative importance of 
each factor as determinants of the CBI index. Therefore, we conduct linear regression analysis where the 
identified dimensions are the independent variables and the CBIW index is the dependent one. Results are shown 
in Table 3.  
The financial factor defined by the national deficit and IMF lending enters negatively and significantly in all the 
specifications, i.e. in full sample models and in both OECD and non-OECD restricted models. Taking in mind 
the correlations between this factor and variables (seen in Table 1), we conclude that economies with more IMF 
lending retain more CBI. This outcome is coherent with the current policy of IMF that controls the laws and 
regulations affecting autonomy, transparency, and governance at the central bank. The Fund pressures the 
economies benefiting from loans programs to reform their central banks toward greater independence, avoiding 
that their government interference can undermine the bank’s autonomy and increase the risks associated with its 
operations. The strong estimated relevance of this variable reflects the importance of the IMF loans program in the 
considered period. In fact, the transition process in Central and Eastern Europe and the crises in emerging market 
economies led to an increase in the demand for IMF resources in the 1990s. Morever, the deep crises in Latin 
America and Turkey kept demand high for IMF resources in the early 2000s. Finally, IMF loans rose again since 
late 2008 with the global financial crisis. The IMF currently has programs with more than 50 countries around the 
world and has committed more than $325 billion in resources to its member countries since the start of the global 
financial crisis.  
Table 3 also suggests that economies with less deficit show a higher CBI (see also Table 1 for the relation 
between the financial factor and deficit). The commitment literature suggests that CBI should be a mechanism 
for signalling the anti-inflationary creditworthiness of governments to international investors. Countries with a 
weak public budget suffer from an excessive inflationary bias, which may increase the interest burden. Therefore, 
the benefits from commitment will tend to be larger (see, Cukierman, 1992). In this context, the expected sign for 
the deficit should be positive. However, our negative sign may be explained as follows. The central bank lending to 
the government, for example of short terms loans, has increased during the periods of financial instability (e.g. the 
Great 2007-2008 financial crises), since a number of governments have turned to central banks for money as 
government liabilities increased, tax revenues declined, and financing for fiscal imbalances from domestic and 
international capital markets was expensive or unavailable. Hence, during deep financial crises, recession and long 
period of low inflation (e.g. 2008-2012 period), society becomes accustomed to deficit monetization, thereby 
reducing opposition to deficit and public pressure for an independent central bank.  
To summarize, IMF loans program works like an “external constraint” for the economies with high deficit and 
more incentive to monetize it, but the financial instability and recession in a period of low inflation (or deflation) 
work in the opposite direction with governments relying extensively on central bank money to finance public 
expenditure. Hence, central banks’ political and operational autonomy is inevitably undermined for the fulfillment 
of their policy objective of preserving price stability. 
 
Now we focus on the institutional factors. Dincer and Eichengreen (2014) state that “there is no evidence that 
countries with more robust political institutions strengthened the independence of their central banks, perhaps 
because the level of CBI was already high”. This is true for OECD economies. However, Table 3 shows that the 
political factor (e.g. freedom of speech, trust in legal system) enters negatively and significantly in the 
specification for non-OECD countries: the less is the strength of political institution, the higher is the incentive 
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to delegate to an independent central bank, except for corruption. In fact, greater the level of corruption, higher is 
the incentive to delegate to an independent central bank.   
Furthermore, for non-OECD economies, the goverment factor also enters negatively and significantly. We recall 
that it only relates to the strength of the first-largest goverment party with respect to the total number of seats of 
the goverment coalition. This evidence, together with the results in Table 1, leads to the following consideration. 
Economies with strong first-largest goverment party have less incentive to delegate to an independent central 
bank. This is in line with the literature on the political economy approach to the CBI, (see Fernández-Albertos, 
2015, and De Haan and Eijffinger, 2017). It suggests that the delegation to an independent central bank is a way 
to facilitate the cohesistence of actors with heterogeneous preferences within the executive, i.e. coalition or 
minority goverment, in particular when information asymmetries are present, for example, between coalition 
goverment parties and the executive. Moreover, multiparty goverment are heavily dependent on the use of fiscal 
policy, and this increase the incentive to delegate in the hands of an independent institution (non-targetable) the 
monetary policy or unpopular policies maximising the probability to be re-elected.  
Finally, the opposition, electoral rule and chief executive factors are not statistically significant, but they design a 
coherent picture reinforcing the comment above. The opposition factor describes the relative weight of the 
three-largest opposition parties to the first-largest goverment party, that is, the degree of political fragmentation 
and the possible heterogeneity of preferences with the risk that intra-party conflicts over policy threaten the 
stability of a goverment. The fragmentation is greater in countries with mixed electoral system, i.e. partly 
majority based and partly proportional based. In fact, they are generally characterized by a stricter control over 
the goverment made by the opposition (captured by the electoral factor). The party political instability may be 
more dramatic if the executive power is characterized by low tenure or high turnover. Leaders with shorter 
period in office are more likely to make opportunistic decisions that entails long-run costs to society that 
outweigh short-run benefits (captured by the chief executive factor).  
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Table 3. Linear regression analysis for the assessment of CBI determinants. 
 
 Basic Model Augmented Model 
Full 
Sample 
OECD Non OECD Full 
Sample 















































































N 80 31 49 57 27 30 
R2 0.21 0.41 0.10 0.41 0.55 0.51 
 
Note. Estimated coefficients in table and relative p-values in parenthesis. The basic model refers to the following 
specification: CBIi= b0 + ∑k b1k Pk + ui, where i is the country-index and Pk is the kth factor extracted from the 
economic and political groups of variables (see Table 1). The augmented model refers to the following 
specification: CBIi = b0+ ∑k b1k Pk+ ∑j b2j Fj + ui, where i is the country-index, Pk and Fj are the kth factor 
extracted from the economic and political groups of variables (see Table 1) and the jth factor extracted from the 
institutional group of variables (see Table 2), respectively. The symbols *, **, *** denote significance level at 




In this paper we have implemented well-known statistical tools such as factorial and regression analysis to 
identify the determinants of a new CBI index from a large database of economic, political and institutional 
variables. The combination of these techniques has been used to synthesize information firstly and then to 
overcome limitations such as omitted variables, multicollinearity and overfitting. Our sample includes data for 
31 OECD and 49 non-OECD economies and covers the period 1998-2010. The results confirm the role of the 
IMF loans program as an international constraint that seems to guide all the economies in their choice of 
independent ccntral banks. However, financial instability, recession and low inflation work in the opposite 
direction with governments relying extensively on central bank money to finance public expenditure. Central 
banks’ political and operational autonomy is inevitably undermined for the fulfillment of their policy objective of 
preserving price stability. Finally, for non-OECD economies, the degree of CBI responds to various measures of 
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strength of political institutions and party political instability. Non-OECD countries with more party political 
instability due to heterogeneous political contexts have a higher incentive to delegate to a more independent 
central bank or, in other words, economies with strong first-largest goverment party have less incentive to 
delegate to an independent monetary authority. The importance of these political and institutional factors suggest 
that the adoption of an independent central bank should be understood not only in terms of economic efficiency 
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Venezuela, Zambia. 
Note 2. Our final sample is constructed from the following databases:  
International Monetary Fund (IMF), available at http://www.imf.org/en/Data;  
World Bank Data, available at http://data.worldbank.org/;  
Federal Reserve Data (FED), available at https://fred.stlouisfed.org/;  
Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI), available 
at http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#home;  
Polity IV database, available at http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscrdata.html;  
Database of Political Institutions (DPI), available at http://www.worldbank.org/en/research. 
